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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS*
A. Issues
This memorandum addresses whether an international criminal law principle
exists requiring that reasoned judgments be rendered in international criminal law trials.
Discussion Part A of this memorandum compares the decision-rendering practices of a
cross-section of the international community. Part B discusses whether a duty to provide
reasoned judgments exists with respect to international criminal law trials, examining the
law governing international tribunals and international customary law. Part C evaluates
the nature, extent, and limits of a duty to provide reasoned judgments by reference to
general human rights principles and the goals of international war crimes tribunals.

B. Summary of Conclusions
(1) Most jurisdictions studied require that judges provide reasons for decisions.
Juries are generally not required, or even allowed, to provide reasons for their
decisions, but exceptions are increasingly common and many jurisdictions have
terminated the use of juries altogether.
Except for the United States, Canada, and Scotland, the jurisdictions studies
require that trial judges give reasons for their opinions. In the United States, trial judges
generally do not give reasons for their decisions. In Canada, they need not, but may be
overturned on appeal for failure to do so where the evidence is strongly disputed. In
Scotland, judges do not give reasons for their decisions as a matter of course, but must do
so at the request of the defendant for appeals purposes. The remaining jurisdictions
generally require that judges provide reasons for their opinions, generally in writing.
*

ISSUE 13: Compare and contrast the ways in which decisions are rendered by adjudicators of fact (judges
or juries) in the common law jurisdictions of USA, Canada, and Britain; the mixed jurisdictions of Israel,
Scotland, and South Africa; and the civil code jurisdictions of France and Belgium. Consider whether an
international criminal law principle exists requiring that reasoned judgments be rendered in international
criminal law trials. Consider the nature, extent, and limit if such duty if it exists, or were to develop.

1

Where juries are used, they are generally not required to give reasons for their
decision. This is especially true in the United States, England, and Canada, where courts
may not inquire into the deliberations of the jury. In contrast, Belgium requires special
verdicts, which involve a list of factual findings made by the jury. Some jurisdictions,
such as Israel and South Africa, have abolished the use of the jury. Jurisdictions that
retain it, especially in Europe where the European Convention on Human Rights may
imply a reasons requirement, are considering alterations to the manner in which juries
deliver verdicts.

(2) An international criminal law principle that fact-finders must provide reasoned
judgments exists, or is at least emerging. Statutes governing international criminal
tribunals expressly require reasoned judgments and the custom of nations supports
a finding that reasoned judgments are required.
While the Statute of the International Court of Justice had no express provision
requiring reasoned judgments, the statutes of all international criminal tribunals created
since require that the accused be provided reasons for the court’s decision in writing.
As indicated in the section comparing national laws, a custom exists, and is
growing stronger, that reasons for decisions are provided in criminal cases. While not all
countries require reasons, the trend is toward doing so. While a case can be made for
preserving secrecy regarding jury deliberations and decisions, they are attributable to the
unique role of the jury as a check on state power and do not apply generally where
professional and independent judges preside.

2

(3) The principle that fact-finders in international criminal proceedings must
provide reasoned judgments is not only found in express provisions and customary
law, but is supported by established human rights principles and by the goals of
international criminal tribunals generally.
The rights to a fair trial and to an effective appeal are broadly recognized and
support a requirement that an accused be told the reasons for a court’s decision.
Specifically, reasons provide an individual convicted of a crime a basis to argue that the
trial court’s decision was flawed or not supported by the evidence. They also ensure that
procedural rules, particularly rules of evidence, are followed at trial. Reasons are the
antithesis of arbitrary decisions prohibited by the principles of fairness in criminal trials.
Not only human rights doctrine, but the foundational underpinnings of the war
crimes tribunals support recognition of a principle that reasoned judgments must be
provide in criminal cases. The tribunals are particularly vulnerable to attacks of
unprincipled decision-making and lack of independence. Fairness, and the perception by
the world community that the trials are fair, is an important prerequisite to deterrence,
which is arguably the principle purpose of the war crimes tribunals. Requiring reasons
for judgments furthers not only fairness, but provides a means of demonstrating that
fairness to outside observers.

3

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was created in 1994 “to address
the murder of almost 1 million Tutsis by Hutu paramilitary forces over three months
during the civil war in Rwanda.1 The Tribunal has jurisdiction to prosecute the persons
responsible for genocide and other serious violations of International Humanitarian Law
committed in the territory of Rwanda in 1994 as well as Rwandan citizens suspected of
such acts or violations in the territory of neighboring states.2
The system was created as one of concurrent jurisdiction: The tribunal was to try
the leaders of the genocide and the Rwandan courts were to try all other responsible
parties.3 The Tribunal consists of three Trial Chambers, with three judges each, and an
Appeals Chamber of five judges. The Appeals Chamber adjudicates appeals from both
the Rwanda Tribunal and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.4
Particularly relevant to this discussion is Article 22 of the Statute of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda,5 regarding judgments. It reads:

(1) The trial chambers shall pronounce judgments and impose sentences
and penalties on persons convicted of serious violations of
international humanitarian law.
(2) The judgment shall be rendered by a majority of the Judges of the
Trial Chamber, and shall be delivered by the Trial Chamber in public.
It shall be accompanied by a reasoned opinion in writing, to which
separate or dissenting opinions may be appended.
1

HOWARD BALL, WAR CRIMES AND JUSTICE 25 (2002) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
40].
2
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, HANDBOOK FOR JOURNALISTS (1998), available at
http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/default.htm.
3
Madeline H. Morris, The Trials Of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 249, 350 (1997) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 73].
4
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, supra note 2.
5
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR. 48th Sess., U.N. Dic.
S/RES/955 (1994) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6].
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III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. Adjudication of Fact in Criminal Proceedings: A Comparative Study
“Perhaps one of the most fundamental of all human rights should be the
entitlement of the defendant to be told the reasons for his conviction and subsequent
sentence.”6 With this statement, John Andrews introduces his comparative study of
human rights in criminal procedure.7 He continues: “[i]f this is a fundamental right, then
it is denied to defendants in most of the procedures studied.”8 The law has evolved since
Andrews published his study in 1982. While such a right is still not universally
embraced, fact-finders in a variety of jurisdictions are increasingly required to provide
reasons for their decisions.
The discussion that follows is organized according to the general rule of each
jurisdiction discussed. Specifically, reasons are not generally required in the United
States and Canada, but are generally required in Israel, South Africa, and Belgium.
Procedures in England, Scotland, and France vary and are in a state of transition, due
largely to the adoption by these nations of the European Convention on Human Rights,
which may require reasoned judgments in all criminal cases.9

1. Reasons Not Generally Required
In many jurisdictions, neither the judge nor the jury is generally required to give
reasons. Even if reasons are not generally required, most jurisdictions provide that the

6

John A. Andrews, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1011 (John A. Andrews ed. 1982) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 39].
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
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judge must or should give reasons in some instances, such as at the request of a party or
where the evidence is convoluted.

a. United States of America
The United States is the strictest adherent to the principle that judges need not
give reasons for their opinions. In the United States, most criminal trials take place in
state courts, and each state has its own laws, so there is no national code of criminal
procedure.10 A state can grant criminal defendants more, but not less, rights than the
Supreme Court, but often has little incentive to do so.11 Criminal procedure law
regarding defendants’ rights is therefore largely comprised of the United States Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution.12
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “[I]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” A jury trial
is a matter of right in all but “petty” offenses.13 A jury usually returns, in open court, a
verdict of either guilty or not guilty.14 The jury does not provide reasons and judges may
not inquire into the rationale behind the jury’s decision.15

10

Craig M. Bradley, United States, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 414 (Craig M.
Bradley ed. 1999) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 42].
11
Id. at 396.
12
Id. at 395. Particularly, the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments govern
criminal procedure. While these amendments facially apply only to the federal government, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the Fourteenth amendment as extending the other amendments to states in the 1960’s.
Id.
13
Id. at 418 (citing Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), in which the Supreme Court defined as
presumptively “petty” a crime for which a sentence of no more than six months is authorized by statute,
regardless of whether the defendant is actually imprisoned or not). The defendant cannot waive this right
without the prosecutor’s consent, but a prosecutor typically prefers a non-jury trial. Bradley, supra note 10
at 418 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 42].
14
Id.
15
See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (judges are prohibited from inquiring into reasons underlying jury verdicts)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15]; see also Gray v. U.S. 174 F.2d 919, 924 (reversing

6

The Supreme Court has not decided whether the use of a special verdict, where
the judge formulates succinct questions of fact necessary to the resolution of the matter,
is permissible. No federal statute authorizes the use of the special verdict, and most
courts find that such a practice infringes on the defendant’s right to trial by jury.
For example, in U.S. v. Spock,16 a federal appeals court found error in the trial
court’s use of a special verdict procedure because of its potential to manipulate the jury’s
decision. “There is no easier way to reach, and perhaps force, a verdict of guilty than to
approach it step by step. . . . By a progression of questions each of which seems to require
an answer unfavorable to the defendant, a reluctant jury may be led to vote for a
conviction which, in the large, he would have resisted.”17 Presumably, when jurors
discuss the case, they often go through the elements of the crime one at a time in just
such a manner to narrow down areas of disagreement and come to the required
unanimous verdict. The court noted that it was the judge’s participation in this forcing of
a decision by use of the special verdict that was objectionable.18
Like juries, judges do not generally give reasons for their decisions in bench
trials, where they serve as finders of fact.19 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(c)
provides that, “[i]f a party requests before the finding of guilty or not guilty, the court

a conviction in which the jury “was erroneously required to render verdicts in the nature of special verdicts
in answer to particulars of the information”) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 30]. The
jury was provided with one verdict form for each criminal count, but each form had several paraphrases,
each with a corresponding blank line on which the jury was to indicate a finding of guilty or not guilty. Id.
16
416 F.2d 165, 182 (1969) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32]. The Court
distinguishes cases in which the use of a special verdict in a criminal case has been upheld as cases where
the procedure benefited the defendant and the defendant did not object. “It is elementary that defendant,
properly advised, may waive even fundamental rights.” Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Sean Doran et. al., Rethinking Adversariness in Nonjury Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 44 (1995)
(“reasoned judgments in criminal bench trials appear to be the exception rather than the rule in the United
States”) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 62].

7

must state its specific findings of fact in open court or in a written decision or opinion.”20
This is a distinct contrast from the rule in federal civil cases that a trial court, in all
actions tried without a jury, “find the facts specifically and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon.”21
The rule that a judge need not give reasons absent a request by the parties is
interpreted quite strictly. For example, one court held that no findings were needed
absent a request even though the court had admitted evidence subject to a condition and
never ruled on whether that condition was ever satisfied.22 Another court indicated that,
where no request is made, “on appeal, findings will be implied in support of the judgment
if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, warrants them.”23
Thus, in federal non-jury cases, reasons are only required if requested before the verdict
is returned. When a request for findings is made, “the Court’s reasoning, finding, and
conclusions must be adequate to enable intelligent appellate review of the basis for that
decision.”24
Going one step further than federal law, many state laws do not require that
judges give reasons for their opinions in nonjury criminal trials under any
circumstances.25 For example, Ohio law provides that, “[i]n a case tried without a jury,

20

FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
22
U.S. v. Bolles, 528 F.2d 1190, 1191 (4th Cir. 1975) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
29].
23
U. S. v. Ochoa, 526 F.2d 1278, 1282 n.6 (5th Cir. 1976) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 33].
24
U.S. v. Silberman, 464 F. Supp. 866, 869 (M.D. Fla. 1979) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 31].
25
Gordon Van Kessel, Hearsay Hazards in the American Criminal Trial: An Adversary-Oriented
Approach, 49 HASTINGS L. J. 477, 518 n. 172 (1998) (rebutting an argument that hearsay evidence need not
be excluded in bench trials because judges are required to write opinions, which prevents them from
improperly using evidence in reaching a decision) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 84].
21

8

the court shall make a general finding.”26 An Ohio appeals court confirmed that a trial
court is not required to state specific findings in its verdict.27 The Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure does not provide for a judge to give reasons for his opinion, an
appeals court stated, holding that it was not error for a trial court to ignore the
defendants’ request to make factual findings.28 A study of Philadelphia bench trials
revealed that judges “sometimes” give reasons for their decisions.29
In many jurisdictions, a written opinion is considered a prerequisite to a
defendant’s ability to appeal.30 This is not so in the United States where, as a general
rule, questions of fact are not reviewable on appeal.31 The appellate court may, however,
reverse convictions for lack of evidence, which implies a finding that the facts were not
decided correctly. 32
Thus, in the United States, neither a judge nor a jury gives written reasons for
their opinions, although a judge must do so at the defendant’s request. On appeal, the
findings of fact are unreviewable, but a reversal for lack of evidence implies a reversal of
the factual findings.
26

See OHIO R. CRIM. P. 23(c) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10]. See also ARIZ R. CRIM.
P. 26(1)(a) (“[T]he term judgment means the adjudication of the court based upon . . . its own finding
following a non-jury trial, that the defendant is guilty or not guilty”) [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 11].
27
State v. D’Ambrosio, No. 57448, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 3781, at *42 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1990)
(holding that the trial record and transcripts are sufficient for an effective appeal) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 28].
28
Hernandez v. Texas, 420 S.W. 2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 27]. The appeals court did not discuss the issue, but succinctly rejected the allegation of
error in only two sentences: “The failure of the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law
as the appellants requested was not an error. Such procedure is not provided for in the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure.” Id
29
Stephen J. Scholhofer, Is Plea-Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1065 (1984) [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 78].
30
See discussion infra Part III.C.1.b.
31
Christopher Osakwe, The Bill of Rights for the Criminal Defendant in American Law: A Case Study of
Judicial Law-Making in the United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at
292 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 51].
32
Bradley, supra note 10, at 422 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 42].
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b. Canada
Like the United States, Canada does not mandate that judges give reasons for their
opinions. Canada differs from the United States, however, in that failure to give reasons
is more likely to result in a reversal on appeal.
Canadian criminal trials are usually heard by a judge sitting without a jury,
although an accused can generally elect to have a trial by jury.33 The Criminal Code
governs criminal procedure.34 The Code is not comprehensive, but is supplemented by
judicial decisions interpreting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the
common law.35 While the Code does not explicitly require the fact-finder in a criminal
trial to provide a reasoned opinion supporting its decision, case law indicates that judges
must provide reasoned opinions in certain circumstances.
The Code is silent on whether trial judges must give reasons for their opinions. A
requirement that judges give reasons may, however, be implicit in the defendant’s right to
appeal. In the words of the Supreme Court of Canada, “it would be wise for trial judges
to write reasons setting out the legal principles upon which the conviction is imposed so
that an error may be more easily identified if there be error.”36 Appeals are allowed on
the grounds that the conviction is unreasonable or not supported by the evidence, entails a
miscarriage of justice, or is based on an error of law.37

33

Kent W. Roach, Canada, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 10, at 74
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 53].
34
R.S.C., ch. 46 (1985) (Can.) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
35
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16].
36
R. v. McMaster, 1 S.C.R. 740 (1996) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 36].
37
Section 686(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., c. C-46 (1985) (Can.), [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 17], provides for an appeal where the appeals court finds that: “(i) the verdict should be set
aside on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence, (ii) the judgment of the
trial court should be set aside on the ground of a wrong decision on a question of law, or (iii) on any ground
there was a miscarriage of justice.”
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In R. v. Burns, the Supreme Court unanimously decided that a judge need not give
reasons for his or her decision.38 The defendant in Burns was convicted of sexual assault
following a trial in which conflicting evidence was presented. The trial judge gave brief
oral reasons for the conviction, essentially stating that he believed the complainant.39 On
appeal, the court, finding the statement of reasons insufficient “to determine whether the
learned trial judge properly directed himself to all the evidence,” set aside the conviction
and directed a new trial.40
The Supreme Court restored the convictions, citing a “general rule that a trial
judge does not err merely because he or she does not give reasons for deciding one way
or another on problematic points.”41 It endorsed this rule on the basis of efficiency. The
court noted that the appellate court focused neither on a lack of evidence to support the
verdicts of guilty, nor on a finding that those verdicts were unreasonable, but on the trial
judge’s failure to “indicate that he had considered certain frailties in the complainant’s
evidence.”42 A judge, the Court held, “is not required to demonstrate that he or she
knows the law and has considered all aspects of the evidence. Nor is the judge required
to explain why he or she does not entertain a reasonable doubt as to the accused’s guilt.”

38

1 S.C.R. 656 (1994) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 35].
The judge’s entire statement of reasons was as follows: “I had the opportunity to hear the evidence of
[the minor complainant] and to observe her demeanor on the witness stand. Although she was not sure of
the exact dates of the specific acts and was confused as to some of the continuing events, she did present
her evidence in an honest and straightforward manner, without equivocation. She was in my opinion a
credible and believable witness. I accept her evidence as to the alleged indecent assaults from 1980 to
1983, and I also accept her evidence as to the sexual assault that occurred in January of 1987. Based upon
that evidence, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty on both counts.” Id.
40
R. v. Burns, 74 C.C.C. (3d) 124 (1992) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 34].
41
Burns, 1 S.C.R. 656 (citing Harper v. The Queen, 1 S.C.R. 2 (1982)) [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 35].
42
Id.
39
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The Court further distinguished insufficient reasons from bad reasons. The
appeals court had relied on a statement in Harper43 that an appeal must be allowed,
“where the record, including the reasons for judgment, discloses a lack of appreciation of
relevant evidence and more particularly the complete disregard of such evidence.” That
statement referred to cases where the trial judge’s reasons demonstrate a failure to grasp
an important point or a choice to disregard it, such that the verdict was unreasonable.
Revisiting the issue, the Supreme Court later held in R. v. R. (D.),44 that where
there is “confused and contradictory evidence,” the trial judge should give reasons for his
or her conclusions.45 The Court reaffirmed Burns, maintaining that the appellate court
will not intervene, “where the reasons demonstrate that the trial judge has considered the
important issues in a case, or where the records clearly reveals the trial judge’s reasons,
or where the evidence is such that no reasons are necessary.”46 In a dissenting opinion,
one justice argued that this case falls squarely within Burns, such that no reasons were
required and that the judge did give reasons in this case, albeit orally.
In general, a judge that provides reasons can ensure that his or her verdict will not
be overturned as unreasonable, especially where the evidence is controverted. The
reasons must be thorough and logical, or the decision will be overturned as unreasonable
or unsupported by the evidence.

43

Id.
2 S.C.R. 291 (1996) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 38].
45
The Supreme Court offered the following example of confused and convoluted evidence: “when [the
victim] testified that her father had cut her on her back, she claimed first that she had to get stitches and
stay overnight in a hospital. Then she testified that her hospital stay lasted three weeks. However, there
were no records of any such hospital stay.” Id. at 54.
46
Id.
44
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In contrast to judges, juries do not give reasons for their verdicts under any
circumstances. 47 Where they are used, juries deliberate in secret,48 and courts “are
prohibited from speculating about the reasoning process of a jury in reaching a verdict.”49
Like a judge’s decision, a jury decision can be appealed if unsupported by the evidence.50
In sum, judges need not, and juries may not, give reasons for their decisions in all
cases. A logical decision that can be supported by the evidence is required by both,
however, because the decisions of either can be overturned if unreasonable.

2. Reasons Generally Required
In the two systems studied where no jury system exists, reasons for decisions are
generally required. In the third jurisdiction where reasons are generally required, the use
of the jury has been largely curtailed. This raises the possibility that the preference for
reasons led to the demise of the jury system. Proponents of the non-jury systems
employed by Israel and South Africa suggest that criminal decisions are more principled
due to the requirement that reasons be given to justify decisions.51

a. Israel
The first system that does not use juries is Israel, where only bench trials exist.
The defendant has no right to a jury trial, but is tried by a single judge, a panel of three

47

Id.; R. v. Noble, 1 S.C.R. 874 (1997) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 37].
Roach, supra note 33, at 74 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 53].
49
Noble, 1 S.C.R. 874 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 37].
50
See Roach, supra note 33, at 75 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 53].
51
Kenneth Mann, Civil Procedure, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL 282 (Amos Shapira & Karen
C. DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995) (noting that the reasons requirement has led to “a large body of case law
describing how judges do and should assess facts and arrive at decisions on factual issues in the trial” and
that such case law is largely absent in systems that rely heavily on the jury trial) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 50].
48

13

judges, or in a Magistrate Court depending on the severity of the offense.52 Israel’s rules
of criminal procedure are grounded in statute and common law principles developed by
the courts.53
At the end of the bench trial, the judge or magistrate presents his or her decision
on factual matters along with a written assessment of the evidence and a reasoned
justification of the factual finding.54 Where three judges hear the case,55 one serves as the
presiding judge.56 When the decision is not unanimous, the majority view prevails, but if
each of the three judges has a different opinion, the presiding judge’s view prevails.57
Israel’s procedure serves as a check on the judiciary by ensuring that the
evidentiary rules are followed. The judge rules on admissibility and must disregard
evidence deemed inadmissible.58 If the reasons indicate that the judge relied on
inadmissible evidence in reaching a verdict, the verdict may be overturned on appeal.59

52

Eliahu Harnon & Alex Stein, Israel in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 10, at
239 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 47].
53
Id. at 217. Israel has no written constitution. In 1992, it enacted Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty,
setting out some generally accepted constitutional human rights. Eliahu Harnon, The Impact of the Basic
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty on the Law of Criminal Procedure and Evidence, 33 ISR. L. REV. 678,
679 (1999) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 67]. “The list of human rights is fairly short
and manifestly not exhaustive.” Id. at 682. For example, it does not mention the right of an accused to a
fair trial. Id.
54
Harnon & Stein, supra note 52, at 282 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 47].
55
Three judges are required for criminal cases where the offense is punishable by imprisonment of ten
years or more or by death. Although the laws of Israel permit capital punishment in special circumstances,
it almost never applied. Hon. Amnon Straschnov, The Judicial System in Israel, 34 TULSA L. J. 527, 528
(1999) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 82]. “Israel’s one and only execution came in
1962 when it hanged Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann for his role in killing 6 million Jews.” Susan
Taylor Martin, Death Penalty Foes Gain Ground, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 9, 1998, at 2A [reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 72].
56
Straschov, supra note 55, at 528 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 82].
57
Drora Karotkin, Effect of the Size of the Bench on the Correctness of Court Judgments, 14 INT’L REV. L.
& ECON. 371, 372 (1994) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 70].
58
Harnon & Stein, supra note 52, at 240 (citing Israeli Evidence Ordinance, Section 56) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 47].
59
Id. at 239 (citing Ploni v. State of Israel, 50(3) P.D. 225 (1993)) [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 47].
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b. South Africa
South Africa, which also does not use juries, is unique among the systems
discussed thus far in its use of assessors. Assessors are like jurors in that they are called
for a specific case and decide questions of fact, but unlike jurors because they give
reasons for their decisions.60 The use of assessors emerged as the use of the jury declined
in South Africa from 1920 until 1969, when the jury system was abolished.61 At present,
a jury system is widely viewed as unworkable in South Africa, partly due to “a history of
all-white juries rendering unjust verdicts against non-white defendants and the problems
of devising a jury system for a complex multi-racial society.”62
In South Africa’s non-jury system, a judge or magistrate is at all times either the
sole fact-finder or a co-finder of fact.63 Magistrates preside in District and Regional
Magistrates’ Courts, which are collectively referred to as “lower courts,” and have
limited jurisdiction based on the seriousness of the offense.64 A judge presides in the
High Court, which has jurisdiction over all cases, but deals in practice only with “the
most serious offenses.”65

60

Neil Vidmar, The Jury Elsewhere in the World, in WORLD JURY SYSTEMS, 425 (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 57].
61
P.R. Spiller, The Jury System in Early Natal, 8 J. LEGAL HIST. 129 (1987) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 81]. The jury system had been introduced by English colonists around
1928. Id.
62
Vidmar, The Jury Elsewhere in the World, supra note 60, at 425 [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 57].
63
P.J. Schwikkard & S.E. van der Merwe, South Africa, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY,
supra note 10, at 351 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 54].
64
Id. at 344. The jurisdiction of District Magistrates’ Courts is limited to twelve months imprisonment and
fines not exceeding R20 000-00. They have no jurisdiction over cases of murder, rape, or high treason.
The jurisdiction of Regional Magistrates’ Courts is limited to ten years imprisonment and fines not in
excess of R200 000-00. They may try all cases, except high treason. Id.
65
Id. at 345.
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The judge in the High Court,66 or magistrate in a lower court,67 may decide to
appoint assessors, two for each case, to assist with the fact-finding function.68 Assessors
deliberate with the judge or magistrate in chambers, deciding only factual questions.69
They must give reasons for their decisions, which become part of the record and are
available to any appeals court.70
Judges and magistrates also give reasons for their decisions, including factual
decisions.71 Where assessors are used, the decision of the majority, not necessarily that
of the judge, is the verdict of the court.72

c. Belgium
In Belgium, a jury trial is available for all criminal cases, but is actually used only
for the most serious offenses, such as murder.73 The jury verdict is a special verdict that
includes questions about the elements charged in the crime and, where appropriate, about
the aggravating and mitigating factors relative to sentencing. The twelve-member jury

66

(South Africa) Criminal Procedure Act of 1977, § 145 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
18]. “Persons appointed as assessors in the High Court must be experienced in the administration of justice
(such as legal practitioners or law lecturers) or must have skill in any matter which may be considered at
the trial (such as accountants or pathologists).” Schwikkard & van der Merwe, supra note 63, at 351
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 54].
67
(South Africa) Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944, § 93ter (1) [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 19]. The experience requirements for assessors in the High Court, see supra note 68, do
not apply in the lower courts, although such experience may be considered. Schwikkard & van der Merwe,
supra note 63, at 351 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 54]. “The appointment of
assessors by magistrates in the lower courts is – unlike the appointment of assessors by judges in the High
Court – essentially aimed at promoting the notion of lay participation in the adjudication of facts in a
criminal trial.” Id.
68
Id. at 350. The judge has discretion over whether to use assessors, although the accused may request
their use. One exception is murder trials, in which a judge must appoint two assessors unless the accused
requests that they not be used; even then, the judge has discretion not to appoint them. Id.
69
Id. at 351.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Vidmar, The Jury Elsewhere in the World, supra note 60, at 445 [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 57].
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votes by secret ballot. Eight out of four jurors must vote in favor of a conviction. 74 If
the jury decides seven to five in favor of guilt on a material fact, the panel of judges who
preside at trial express their opinion on the question of guilt; failure to agree with the
majority results in acquittal.75
Belgium has different courts for different types of offenses, but all have similar
procedures with regard to the delivery of judgment.76 The judgment must be given with
reasons and is pronounced in public.77

3. Evolving Systems: Reasons Sometimes Required
Great Britain, Scotland, and France are categorized as “evolving” systems
because the European Convention on Human Rights is leading, or is likely to lead, to
changes in the criminal procedure laws of these countries.78 Specifically, these
jurisdictions did not formerly mandate that judges give reasons for their decisions, while
the convention may be interpreted as requiring such reasons.79

74

Id.
Marc Chatel, Human Rights and Belgian Criminal Procedure at Pre-Trial and Trial Level, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 190 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
43].
76
Id.
77
Belgian Constitution, Articles 96-97, translated in THE CONSTITUTION OF BELGIUM AND THE BELGIAN
CIVIL CODE 40 (John H. Crabb trans. 1982) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20]. The
text of the constitution is also available in English at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/be00000_.html.
78
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3] was drawn up in 1950 and entered into force in 1953. The
Convention lists a set of civil and political rights and freedoms and sets up a mechanism for their
enforcement. The Convention provides for a European Court of Human Rights in Protocol No. 11 (added
by amendment and effective November 1, 1998). Any State or individual may bring a suit as a victim of a
violation of the Convention. THE REGISTRAR OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, ORGANISATION, AND PROCEDURE (2003)
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Edocs/Historical Background.htm [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 77].
79
Note that Belgium is also subject to the convention, but required reasons for decisions of both judges and
juries even before the convention took effect. See discussion, supra Part III.A.2.c for a complete discussion
of Belgian procedure regarding delivery of judgments.
75
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Article 6 of the Convention provides that in all criminal trials, a defendant is
entitled to “a fair and public hearing” and that “[j]udgment shall be pronounced
publicly,”80 but does not explain what makes a hearing “fair” or what must be included in
the “judgment.”81 Human rights lawyers argue that “verdicts are not in themselves
reasoned judgments and that defendants are being denied justice if they are not told the
reasons for their convictions.”82 The European Court of Human Rights, which enforces
the Convention, “takes the line that a reasoned decision is an essential component of a
‘fair trial.’”83

a. Great Britain
Criminal offenses in Great Britain are divided into three categories with a
different procedure for each. The offenses are categorized by severity of impact on the
community. The least serious are summary offenses, tried in a magistrate’s court without
a jury; the most serious are indictable offenses, which are tried at the Crown Court before
a judge and jury. A number of offenses fall in between and are triable either way. 84
The jury acts as fact-finder in the Crown Court.85 The judge may decide that the
facts are not in dispute, such that there is no case to go to a jury, and direct or order a

80

European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Rights, Art. 6 [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 3].
81
See Andrews, supra note 6, at 11 (noting that “it does not say that judgment shall be given with reasons
for the decision reached”) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 39].
82
Robert Verkaik, New Law Will Force Juries to Give Reasons for Their Verdicts, THE INDEPENDENT,
August 25, 2000 at 1 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 85].
83
J.R. Spencer, English Criminal Procedure and the Human Rights Act 1998, 33 ISR. L. REV. 664, 675
(1999) (citing P. VAN DIJK AND G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 437-438 (3rd ed., 1998)) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 80].
84
David J. Feldman, England and Wales, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 10,
at 114 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 44].
85
For a discussion of the declining use and increasingly limited role of juries in England, see K.W.
Lidstone, Human Rights in the English Criminal Trial, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 6, at 105 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 48].
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verdict. The jury is generally neither required nor allowed to give reasons for its
verdicts.86
It has long been recognized that the English jury, because it need not give reasons
for its verdict, has the power to nullify, or return a verdict that is not in accordance with
the law.87 A defendant can, however, appeal on the ground “that the verdict of the jury
should be set aside on the ground that under all the circumstances of the case it is unsafe
or unsatisfactory.”88 The appeals court rarely overturns on that ground, preferring to
defer to the trial court on issues of fact.89
Until recently, judges typically gave reasons for their judgments, but magistrates
did not.90 In the magistrates' courts, guilt or innocence was usually decided without
giving reasons, but either side could require the court to give its reasons by instituting an
appeal and requesting a stated case.91
In anticipation of the Human Rights Act of 1998, the Lord Chancellor's
Department advised magistrates that in criminal cases they would be required to give
reasons automatically; this has become the general practice since October 2000.92 The
Human Rights Act took effect on October 2, 2000, and incorporates into English law
86

Spencer, English Criminal Procedure and the Human Rights Act 1998, supra note 83, at 675 [reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 79]. It is a contempt of court to obtain, disclose or solicit any
particulars of any statements made, opinions expressed, arguments advanced or votes cast by members of
the jury in the course of their deliberations. See Contempt of Court Act 1981, § 8(1) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
87
See e.g., John D. Jackson, Making Juries Accountable, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 477 (2002) (arguing that the
ability of juries to render decisions inconsistent with settled law amounts to a lack of accountability that is
no longer acceptable) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 69].
88
Criminal Appeals Act § 2(1) (1968) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
89
Lidstone, supra note 85, at 105 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 48].
90
See Ian Francis, Will it All End in Middle Tiers?, 151 NEW L. J. 7008 (2001) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 65].
91
Magistrates' Courts Act, 1980, § 111 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24]. See infra
Part A.3.b for a discussion of the stated case procedure in the context of criminal appeals in Scotland.
92
J.R. Spencer, Inscrutable Verdicts, the Duty to Give Reasons and Article 6 of the European Convention
on Human Rights, ARCHBOLD NEWS, February 14, 2001, at 5-6 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 80].
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certain rights and freedoms set out in the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Article 6 of the Act incorporates the
convention by reference; it thus requires a “fair trial” and “public” pronouncement of a
“judgment.”93
It is not clear what effect the Human Rights Act will ultimately have on jury
trials. “Although three respected English commentators tell us reassuringly that ‘the
requirement to give reasons must be limited so as to take account of the way that jury
trials operate,’ it is far from clear that the [European Court of Human Rights] would
accept this view.”94 In the case of bench trials, the court has “stressed the importance of
a reasoned judgment, particularly in the context of suspect evidence or evidence that
cannot solely justify a conviction.”95 At least one English judge has suggested that the
regular use of the special verdict, in which the jury decides discrete factual questions
rather than returning a general verdict, be implemented in order to ensure a fair trial.96
The judge cited ensuring an effective right of appeal as the basis for his proposal.97

b. Scotland
In Scotland, the Lord Advocate is ultimately responsible in most cases for
deciding whether to prosecute, in what court, and under which procedure.98 Two types of
93

See Human Rights Act of 1998 Ch. 42, § 6 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23] and
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 6 [reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3].
94
Spencer, English Criminal Procedure and the Human Rights Act 1998, supra note 83, at 675 (citing D.J.
HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 215 (1995)) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 79].
95
Jackson, supra note 90, at 511 (citing Murray v. U.K., 22 E.H.R.R. 29 (1996)) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 69].
96
See Rona Epstein, In the News: The Human Rights Act – Will the Law Ever be the Same Again, 151 NEW
L. J. 7005 (2001) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 64].
97
See id.
98
David M. Walker, THE SCOTTISH LEGAL SYSTEM 531 (6th ed, 1992) [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 58].
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jurisdiction, solemn and summary, are available and the choice between the two depends
on gravity of the offense.99 Scotland differs from many systems in that the defendant has
no say in whether a jury hears his or her case.100 Procedure depends on jurisdiction.
Trial for a solemn offense is before a jury and either a judge of the High Court of
Justiciary or a sheriff.101 Summary procedure consists of trial on complaint without a
jury before a sheriff, magistrate, or one or more justices of the peace.102 Whichever
procedure is used, reasons are not routinely offered for criminal verdicts.103
Solemn procedure is used for relatively serious crimes and always involves a
fifteen-member jury.104 At the close of evidence, the judge charges the jury, instructing
them on the law and on the points in issue;105 the judge does not summarize the
evidence.106 The jury may give a verdict at once or retire to the jury room to consider
it.107 A simple majority is required. The possible verdicts are guilty, not guilty, and not
proven.108 The jury states only the verdict and whether the jury was unanimous; if not
unanimous, the jury does not state the number of the majority.109 No reasons are

99

Id.
Peter Duff, The Scottish Criminal Jury: A Very Peculiar Institution, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 173
(1999) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 63].
101
Walker, supra note 98, at 532 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 58].
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 537 (citing Hamilton v. H.M.A., 1938 J.C. 134; Rubin v. H.M.A., 1984 S.C.C.R. 96; King v.
H.M.A., 1985 S.C.C.R. 322).
106
Duff, supra note 100, at 173 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 63].
107
Walker, supra note 98, at 538 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 58].
108
Charles N. Stoddart, Human Rights in Criminal Procedure: The Scottish Experience, in HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 6, at 137-138 [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 55].
109
See Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 c. 46 § 100(1) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 26]. A reform committee considered the possibility that the number of the majority be announced in
open court to prevent mistakes, but rejected such a proposal in the interests of preserving the privacy of
jury deliberations. Duff, The Scottish Criminal Jury: A Very Peculiar Institution, supra note 100, at 191
(citing the Thompson Committee, Criminal Procedure in Scotland, Second Report, Cmnd. 6218 Para.
51.51-56 (1975)) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 63].
100
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given.110 Under the Contempt of Court Act of 1981, “it is contempt for anyone to obtain,
disclose, or solicit any particulars of the deliberations in the jury room.”111
Whether a jury verdict may be overturned on the basis that it is unreasonable has
been the subject of some debate in Scotland. There were originally three grounds for
appeal in a solemn case, the most relevant here was that “the verdict of the jury . . . was
unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.”112 “Despite this
wording, the Appeal Court never granted an appeal based solely on the perversity of the
jury’s decision, allowing appeals under this heading only where the jury’s verdict was
self-contradictory or illogical in some way.”113
In 1980, the three original grounds for appeal were replaced with the standard
“miscarriage of justice.”114 The courts still demonstrated reluctance to overturn a
conviction merely because a jury verdict was unreasonable.115 In his 1984 book on
appeals, High Court Judge Lord McCluskey states that it “seems doubtful that the Appeal
Court will ever ‘retreat from the notion . . . that the conclusions . . . of the jury . . . are
sancrosanct and inviolable whatever the weight and coherence of the evidence.’”116

110

Walker, supra note 98, at 538 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 58].
Duff, supra note 100, at 173 (citing Contempt of Court Act 1981§ 8(c)(1)) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 63].
112
Id. (citing the Criminal Appeal (Scotland) Act 1926 § 2. The two other grounds were more general.
They were “a wrong decision on any question of law” and “a miscarriage of justice.” Id.
113
Duff, supra note 100, at 173 (citing Salmond v. H.M. Advocate, (1992) S.L.T. 156, 157-58 (H.C.J. Sept
9 1990), where appeal was allowed from a jury verdict of guilty of attempted murder with extreme
provocation because provocation is not relevant to a charge of attempted murder) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 63].
114
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980 § 33 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25].
115
Duff, supra note 100, at 173 (citing ROBERT WEMYSS RENTON & HENRY HILTON BROWN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (6th ed. 1996) Para. 29-07, which Duff describes as “the ‘bible’ for Scots criminal lawyers,” id.
at n. 15.) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 63].
116
Duff, supra note 100, at 173, quoting LORD MCCLUSKEY, CRIMINAL APPEALS 188 (1992) [reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 63].
111
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The Sutherland Committee evaluated various aspects of the appeals process in
1996, including the question of overturning the jury’s verdict.117 The Committee
generally agreed that the Appeal Court should be hesitant to overturn a jury verdict, but
should do so in the exceptional case where the verdict is “unreasonable and has resulted
in a miscarriage of justice.”118 The Crime and Punishment Act of 1997 incorporates the
Committee’s recommendations, retaining one ground for appeal, “miscarriage of justice,”
but including under that heading cases in which a jury “returned a verdict which no
reasonable jury, properly directed, could have returned.”119
Summary procedure involves no trial by jury. The judge decides issues of fact
and usually pronounces a verdict immediately after the close of the evidence.120 Reasons
for a decision are only given when a party appeals, which either side may do in summary
cases.121
As with jury verdict appeals, the appeals procedure in summary cases has also
been problematic due to the lack of a requirement that the judge provide reasons for his
or her opinion. Either party dissatisfied with the outcome may initiate an appeal by
applying to the court to “state a case” for the appeals court, the High Court of
Justiciary.122 The stated case includes the court’s reasoning. The procedure for drafting
it has been a source of controversy.
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Until 1980, the judge prepared a draft stated case, which was to include the
factual findings relevant to the decision and the judge’s reasoning. The draft was sent to
the parties, who then had one month to propose changes, which the judge was bound by
statute to consider.123 As the judge had the ability to reject the proposals altogether
without a hearing and without giving reasons to justify the objection, this procedure
sometimes led to injustice.124 One example is the case of D.C. Anderson, a former
Solicitor-General for Scotland convicted of breach of the peace. He employed his own
note-taker to record the evidence submitted at the trial and used that record to propose
lengthy adjustments to the draft Stated Case. The proposals were all refused by the
sheriff, who provided no reason for the refusal. Anderson was therefore unable to argue
about any omitted details during his appeal.125
The Anderson case was the subject of much debate centering on whether the
defendant’s rights were violated.126 A committee reviewing criminal procedure law
recommended mandatory hearings on adjustments proposed by the parties and a
requirement that the judge state the rejected proposals and his reasons for not
incorporating them into the stated case.127 These proposals have been adopted.128
Scotland does not appear to have changed its procedures in response to
indications by the European Court of Human Rights that the European Convention on

123

See Duff, supra note 100 at 174 (citing Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1965 § 442-455) [reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 63].
124
Stoddart, supra note 108, at 141 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 55].
125
Id.
126
Id. at 140-141.
127
Id. at 141 (citing the Third Report of the Thompson Committee, Ch. 8).
128
Id. (citing the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980 § 3).

24

Human Rights requires reasoned judgments in all criminal cases.129 It seems unlikely
that the system will remain as it is, particularly as England and Wales have changed their
procedures and continue to consider proposals for further reform.130

c. France
In France, most procedural issues are governed by detailed provisions in the Code
of Criminal Procedure.131 France’s constitution has few provisions relating to criminal
procedure, but the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, binding on French courts, has an increasing effect on French
procedural law.132 Procedural rules depend on the nature of the offense; trials for more
severe offenses are generally subject to more elaborate safeguards.133
The Assize court, which hears major felonies, consists of three professional
judges and nine lay jurors who decide guilt and sentence together.134 This is the only
instance where lay participants are still used. The traditional jury system was abandoned
in 1942 in favor of this mixed tribunal of lay persons and judges working together to
decide facts.135 The most minor offenses are tried in the Police Court before a single
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professional judge.136 Offenses that fall in between are tried in Correctional Court before
one or three professional judges.137
The procedure in all three courts is similar regarding the delivery of judgments.
After closing arguments, the court deliberates on issues of both guilt and sentence.138 In
Correctional and Police Courts, the court must render a written judgment order citing the
reasons for the decision, including the principal facts supporting guilt as well as the law
violated. In the Assize Court, the judgment order is simply the mixed court’s verdict of
guilty or not guilty as to each offense, findings of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, and the sentence imposed.139
Most countries that employ juries require only a general verdict of guilty or not
guilty with no explanation from the jurors.140 One justification for the jury is that it is
better at finding the facts than the judge acting alone and, consequently, it is difficult to
justify any judicial interference with the verdict of the jury.141 The general rule that the
judiciary cannot inquire into the reasons for a jury’s decision also allows the possibility
of jury nullification, acquitting a defendant who is factually guilty.142 The power to
nullify enhances the jury’s role as a “check on the power of the state.” 143 Since judicial
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inquiry would likely erode the power to nullify, it should not be allowed if the jury is to
retain its role as a check on the state.
Requiring the finder of fact to give reasons for decisions is more common with
respect to professional judges than lay juries. Judges are expected in all cases to apply the
law accurately and fairly; many view a reasons requirement as a means to ensure judicial
accountability in this respect.144 The procedure is more varied when a judge acts as factfinder with procedures ranging from requiring that reasons be given in all cases to not
requiring reasons in any cases.

B. Duty to Provide Reasoned Judgments: Sources in International Criminal Law
At issue is whether a principle exists in international law that the finder of fact in
a criminal trial must provide a reasoned judgment. There are two basic types of
international criminal law: international agreements and customary international law.145
A principle that reasoned judgments are required of the finder of fact in criminal trials is
found in both sources of law.
1. Express Statutory Provisions
International agreements are technically binding only upon the signatories to such
agreements and their nationals.146 They may also be a source of international law,
although some scholars would limit the authority of treaties to filling in gaps where
international law is unclear.147 A duty to provide reasoned judgments is expressly created
144

Jackson, supra note 87, at 487 (noting the increase in jurisdictions requiring that judges at all levels give
reasons for decisions and linking the trend to an increased demand for judicial accountability) [reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 69].
145
JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 4 (2000) [reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 52].
146
Id.
147
Id.

27

by the governing documents of most international criminal law tribunals, suggesting that
such a requirement is a norm of international criminal law.
As early as 1973, the Bangladesh International Crimes (Tribunals) Act provided
that “the Judgment of a Tribunal as to the guilt or the innocence of any accused person
shall give the reasons on which it is based[, but] each member of the tribunal shall be
competent to deliver a judgment of his own.148 The statutes governing the International
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda similarly provide for “a
reasoned opinion in writing, to which separate or dissenting opinions may be
appended.”149
A reasons requirement is also included in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court.150 It differs from the earlier statutes in that it does not seem to provide
for separate opinions: “The Trial Chamber shall issue one decision. Where there is no
unanimity, the Trial Court’s decision shall contain the view of the majority and the
minority.”151 This provision is not entirely clear, but it suggests that each member of the
chamber would have to agree on the wording of a single opinion embracing the views of
all. This differs both from the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, which allow each judge to write his or her own opinion, uncensored by the
others, and from some jurisdictions that allow only the majority to express its an opinion.
As these statutes demonstrate, international criminal tribunals almost always
expressly provide that judges deliver reasons for their opinions. This may be due to the
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increased needs of such tribunals to demonstrate legitimacy and independence.152 When
judges must explain the analysis they employed in reaching a decision, that decision is
less open to criticism that the outcome was predetermined and the trial was just for show.

2. Customary Law
International criminal law is not limited to express provisions in sources of
international law, but also in customary international law. Customary international law
“is of a universally obligatory nature.”153 To prove that a certain rule is customary one
has to show that it is reflected in state practice and that there exists a conviction in the
international community that such practice is required as a matter of law.”154
As illustrated in Part A, requirements that judges give reasons for their decisions
in criminal cases is increasingly common in national jurisdictions the world over. Juries
are not typically required to give reasons for their decisions, but the declining use of
juries and the trend toward requiring juries that are used to provide reasons for their
judgments confirms an emerging trend of reasons requirements. Where a traditional jury
is preserved, it may be viewed as a narrow exception to a general rule of requiring
reasoned judgments, because the jury occupies in those legal systems the dual role of
arbiter of justice and check on state power.
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It is quickly becoming the state practice in nearly all jurisdictions that judges
provide reasons for their decisions. In some countries, particularly those without a jury
system, judges have long been required to explain their decisions. Judges at all levels are
now required by statute to give reasons for their decisions in England.155 Even in
Canada, which has no statutory requirement that judges give reasons for decisions in
criminal cases, the Supreme Court has suggested that a failure to give reasons is
reversible error on appeal.156
The trend toward requiring reasons for criminal verdicts is perhaps more evident
in reforms in the jury system. Jury verdicts were historically inscrutable; the jury was
even seen as having wide latitude to disregard the law altogether and decide on the basis
of conscience without being overturned on appeal.157 Many systems have stopped using
juries in criminal trials. Those that retain juries are beginning to allow special verdicts,
where a jury gives specific factual findings.158 Significantly, Spain and Russia have
recently reintroduced juries but a general verdict is not used. In those systems, the jury is
presented with a set of questions, which may be very detailed, and they must give a
rationale for the verdict.159
In Israel, South Africa, and Belgium, juries are not typically used in the traditional
sense. Israel and South Africa do not use juries at all; South Africa has replaced juries
with lay assessors who work with judges and magistrates to make factual findings.
Belgium retains the jury system, but requires special verdicts, or detailed findings of fact,
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rather than a general verdict of guilty or not guilty. In all of these systems, a judge is
required to give reasons for his or her decisions.160
In Canada and the United States, juries do not give reasons for their opinions and
judges are not generally required to. A caveat is that the Canadian Supreme Court has
demonstrated a willingness to overturn convictions not clearly supported by the evidence
absent some explanation from the judge.161
England has recently implemented changes in their criminal procedure in order to
comply with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. The convention requires the public pronouncement of
“judgments” in criminal cases, which has been interpreted as a reasons requirement, at
least in cases heard by a judge.162 Scotland and France will likely follow suit. The future
of jury trials in these systems is unclear, but it seems likely that more specific findings of
fact will replace the traditional jury verdict of guilty or not guilty without reasons.
Despite these changes, juries are still generally not required, or even permitted, to
give reasons for their verdicts. This may be due to the unique role of a lay jury as a
check on the state.163 It is viewed as a “means whereby ordinary people’s common-sense
can inform decisions and contain the powers of government.”164 Some suggest that,
because of this role, the jury “must be permitted to look at more than logic.”165
Delivering reasoned opinions is not seen as a priority where a jury is used, so a jury
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generally need not explain its decision. The use of a jury may therefore be seen as a
unique feature of some domestic legal systems. That juries need not provide reasoned
decisions appears to be an exception to a general principle that reasons be given in all
criminal decisions.
That the fact-finder must provide reasoned judgments is a principle of
international criminal law. This is evidenced both by the inclusion of such a requirement
in the statutes of international criminal law and the widespread state practice of requiring
reasoned judgments. This reasons requirement is grounded in general human rights
principles relative to criminal defendants, but is not absolute, as demonstrated in the
section that follows.

C. Nature, Extent, and Limits of the Duty to Provide Reasons
The express requirement by international criminal tribunals and the custom of
nations indicate an international standard that reasoned judgments be provided in
criminal cases. Such a standard is also implied in human rights law generally and, in the
context of international criminal tribunals, by the foundational principles of those
tribunals. Human rights law and the principles guiding the operation of international
criminal tribunals also limit the extent of such a duty.

1. Human Rights Law Implications
Because international tribunals and domestic systems are increasingly requiring
reasons for the decisions of both judges and juries, a reasons requirement is emerging as
customary international law. The requirement is both bolstered by, and must be tempered
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with other protections provided by, existing human rights law. Two such protections
relevant to criminal defendants are the right to appeal and the right to a fair trial.
(b) The Right to an Effective Appeal
Perhaps one of the most compelling reasons for requiring reasons for criminal
verdicts is to allow the defendant to appeal. “The more clearly articulated the grounds for
a decision, the greater the opportunity to challenge that decision, by reference to the
record, on appeal.”166 A defendant’s right to appeal is widely recognized in many nations
and by many human rights conventions. For example, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights provides that “[e]veryone convicted of a crime shall have the right to
his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law”167
Some argue that delays will occur due to an increased volume of appeals when
judges give reasons for their opinions on which defendant may base an appeal. This
argument is unfounded for two reasons. First, findings of fact are still relatively final
even in a bench trial where reasons are given, due to the general reluctance of appeals
courts to overturn findings of fact made at trial where the judge was able to see and hear
the witnesses and other evidence, and, presumably, better judge credibility.168 Second, a
reasons requirement may streamline the appeals system, as a party can better assess his or
her chances at a successful appeal when the reasons for the decision are clearly
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explained.169 “[W]ithout reasons the losing party will not know whether the court
misdirected itself and thus whether he may have an available appeal on the substance of
the case.”170 This would result in less frivolous appeals and may actually enhance
efficiency in the long run.
The tradeoff for increased appealability is a decrease in finality of judgments,
which implicates such policy concerns as efficiency and validity. As stated by Sean
Doran, “the requirement that the judge give a reasoned judgment is an implicit
recognition that the sense of finality that attaches to the jury’s verdict is of less force in
the nonjury contest.”171

a. The Right to a Fair Trial
The right to affair trial is acknowledged in most, if not all, international
documents.172 There is, however, no universal agreement as to what constitutes a fair
trial. Some common concepts are that decisions not be arbitrary,173 that defendants not
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be convicted of laws not in force at the time of the action,174 and that trials not be subject
to unreasonable delays.175
One commentator suggests that a professional judge who must give reasons for
his or her decisions renders more logical or rule-bound results than does a jury not
required to offer reasons.176 It is difficult to attack a judgment clearly and logically
reasoned from existing rules as arbitrary. It follows that if the notion that a reasons
requirement leads to more logical or rule-bound decisions is valid, a duty to provide
reasoned judgments protects defendants from arbitrary decisions. Logical and rule-bound
decisions may also ensure that a defendant is not convicted of ex post facto laws, since
the judge is required to articulate the rule applied and its source.
Increased appealability may, however, adversely affect a defendant’s right to a
speedy trial. Voluminous appeals may lead to serious delays before matters are finally
resolved. If more decisions are overturned as a result of a reasons requirement, courts
might become clogged as cases are remanded for a new trial. Efficiency is a significant
concern for the Rwandan tribunal, as it has been criticized as fraught with unnecessary
delays due to bureaucracy.177 Some are resigned to the notion that “the best form of
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justice that the ICTR or the national courts will be able to render will be justice
delayed.”178 Of course, if unjust decisions are the only other option, delay may be the
better of two evils. Still, delays might become so serious as to unreasonably infringe on
the defendants’ human rights.
While it may lead to delays, the enhanced ability to appeal that arises from
reasoned judgments also contributes to ensuring that trials are fair. For example, appeals
may be the only way to ensure that procedural rules were followed at trial. Reasoned
opinions are especially useful in ensuring that evidence rules are adhered to. This offers
an additional basis for the general rule that juries need not give reasons for their opinions.
In a jury trial, a judge determines issues of admissibility; the jury is only exposed to
evidence after it is deemed admissible. There is thus no risk that the jury will consider
inadmissible evidence in reaching its decision.179
In contrast, a judge “is routinely exposed to inadmissible and prejudicial
evidence, with the attendant risk that any decision on guilt will be tainted thereby.”180
Many argue that requiring a judge to write a reasoned opinion is the best method of
ensuring that inadmissible evidence is not used in reaching a decision.181 In the words of
one commentator, a reasoned judgment requirement “converts evidentiary barriers from
input controls to output controls. Their failure to serve as a barrier to the flow of
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information to the fact-finder is made up by requiring the fact-finder to use them to shape
the contours of his or her final decision.”182
It can be argued that a judge will not decide differently than he or she would
absent a reasons requirement, but instead be careful to write an opinion so that it
demonstrates only use of admissible evidence. Trials would therefore be less efficient,
due to the time it would take judges to craft such opinions, and the decisions no more
rooted in evidence than before. Even if some judges disregarded procedural rules, the
reasons requirement would be useful. In the extreme cases, where a verdict necessarily
rests on inadmissible evidence, a judge would be faced with the choice of crafting an
illogical opinion or returning the correct verdict based on admissible evidence. If the
judge returned such an unsupported verdict, it would almost certainly be overturned on
appeal.
Furthermore, judges be more careful about their evaluation of evidence because
they would have to explain, one step at a time, what led them to the decision. “The duty
to give reasons concentrates the mind with the result that a reasoned decision is more
likely to be soundly based on the evidence than one which is not reasoned.”183
In some jurisdictions, the right to trial by a jury of one’s peers is considered an
element of a fair trial.184 In those jurisdictions, a reasons requirement may detract from
the right to a fair trial by limiting or eliminating the jury’s role as independent of the
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state.185 Such a derogation of the jury’s ability to judge independently is more difficult to
justify because the benefits of reasoned judgments are diminished in the jury context.
For example, concerns about the use of inadmissible evidence are less persuasive as a
basis for requiring reasons with respect to juries compared to judges.186 This is because
the judge serves as a screen and a jury is often not exposed to inadmissible evidence.
There is still the danger, however slight, of misuse of evidence stemming from the
admission of evidence for one purpose but not another and the risk that a jury will give
more weight to evidence than is justified by its credibility.187

2. Fulfilling the Purposes Behind the Creation of War Crimes Tribunals
While the concerns discussed thus far are relevant to all criminal adjudications,
some additional issues are of special importance with respect to international criminal
law. The reasons for the creation and execution of international criminal law necessarily
guide the procedures used to administer it.
Fairness is central to any system of justice, and international criminal tribunals are
no exception. Perhaps as important as actual fairness, though, is the appearance of
fairness. War crimes tribunals exist today in the shadow of the Nuremberg trials, which
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are often criticized as imposing victors’ justice, applying retroactive laws, and denying
the procedural rights essential to a fair trial.188 “If the rule of law is to gain acceptance
throughout the world, it is not sufficient that trials of international criminals are just, but
that they are widely recognized as just.”189 A system of international criminal justice is
not likely to achieve its goals if observers dismiss the entire exercise as a puppet show or
victor’s justice.
One aspect of the appearance of justice is the independence of the tribunal.190
Accountability is often viewed as limiting independence. Judges that are accountable to
an outside authority are not completely free to decide cases in a manner adverse to that
authority. For that reason, “[a]ccountability is often contrasted with independence with
much debate as to where the balance between these should be struck.”191 Many argue in
favor of requiring a fact-finder to offer reasons for its opinions on the ground that it
increases its accountability.192 It does not necessarily follow that judges who provide
reasons are less independent than they would be if not required to give reasons.
First, the possibility that the tribunal’s independence will be compromised arises
whenever a tribunal makes a decision that is not what the authority to which it is
accountable would prefer. This is so whether reasons are provided for a judgment or not.
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It is not clear that a country would be less pleased with a judge finding one of its military
heroes guilty of a war crime if the judge provided reasons for that decision than it would
be if the judge did not. In some cases, the opposite may be true. A judge can justify a
decision that it makes that conflicts with its authority’s interests by providing a reasoned
opinion explaining how it was logically and legally required to find in the manner it did.
Second, reasoned judgments may be evaluated as making the judge more
accountable, not to his or her appointer, but to the defendants and to the public served by
the tribunal.193 Accountability may be defined as the duty of a public decision maker to
explain, legitimate and justify a decision and to make amends where a decision causes
injustice and harm.194 Providing fully reasoned opinions in writing serves to make the
tribunal accountable in this way as well.
It may be that an individual convicted by a war crimes tribunal will never concede
that his or her actions were unlawful or that his case was tried fairly. It may, however, be
important in such a context, that those not a party to the action view the trial as just and
the actions as condemnable. Reasoned opinions are one way to ensure that the process be
viewed as rational rather than arbitrary and the outcomes viewed as the legitimate result
of real trials, rather than predetermined convictions.
Legitimacy is important not just for its own sake, but as a prerequisite to
deterrence, a central goal of any system of criminal justice. One of the primary aims of
any war crimes tribunal is to reliably document history, and one strong reason for
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recording such a history is to prevent the occurrence of future atrocities. In the words of
Cherif Bassiouni:
The world needs to establish a historic record of major international
crimes, if for no other reason than to establish the truth and to educate
future generations. Maybe then we can deter potential criminals and avoid
the repetition of those crimes. Otherwise, we are condemned to repeat the
mistakes of the past.195

Absent a reasons requirement, “the judge has a strong incentive to leave the
record vague.”196 Writing a reasoned opinion takes time and thoughtfulness and carries
with it the risk that an appellate court will view it as incorrect. Indeed, the more detailed
the opinion, the more susceptible it is to challenge on appeal.197
A reasoned judgment raises issues about the validity and the appearance of
fairness when employed in systems where a panel of judges hears a case. Requiring that
a number of judges agree on the specific reasons for the opinion poses some practical
difficulty, as even stylistic differences can be a bar to agreement. To the extent that a
panel of judges cannot agree on a written opinion, the inclusion of dissents or
concurrences may detract from the validity of the judgment.
Both the Rwanda statute and the Rome statute require written reasoned opinions.
Interestingly, while the Rwanda statute provides for the inclusion of separate and
dissenting opinions, the Rome Statute does not. “The Trial Chamber shall issue one
decision. When there is no unanimity, the Trial Chamber’s decision shall contain the
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views of the majority and the minority.”198 A decision by a divided court may lead to
doubt as to it soundness and rationality.199 On the other hand, it may add to a general
perception that the procedure is legitimate, as one would probably not expect dissents in a
case where the outcome was predetermined. Different opinions may result where the
tribunals act from emotion rather than rationality, but irrationality would presumably be
clear from the text of the opinion.
In most jurisdictions studied, judges must give reasons for their decisions in
criminal trials, at least when the defendant so requests. While juries generally do not
give such reasons, this is due to the special position juries occupy as a check on state
power, with the ability to nullify a law deemed unjust, and the need for juries willing to
serve without fear that their deliberations will be scrutinized. In addition to this
widespread state practice, the statutes of international criminal tribunals require that
judges give reasons for their decisions. A reasons requirement is therefore a principle of
international criminal law. This is a confirmation of the centrality of such a requirement
to respect for the human rights of criminal defendants, particularly the right to a fair trial
and to an effective appeal. The principle is also especially useful in the context of
international criminal tribunals, where reasoned judgments meet a heightened need for
independence and legitimacy to counter the criticism that such tribunals only mete out
victor’s justice. Judges in international criminal tribunals must therefore give reasons for
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their opinions in order to comply with international criminal law, respect the rights of the
accused, and convey a sense of legitimacy.
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